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INTRODUCTION 
The rights associated with the use of water in the semi-arid regions 
of the world are critical for agricultural, industrial, and municipal 
exi stence, development, and expans i on. Such is certa in 1 y the case in the 
western United States. 
Miners, not farmers, were the first major group to claim a right to 
water use in the American West. These miners often built diversionary 
structures and established a "use" for water for hydrolic mining. It 
appears that farmers "first in time, first in right" use of water was 
viewed in the same manner as were "first in time, first in right" mining 
claims (Western States Water Council, 1984). The doctrine of prior 
appropriation resulted from this tradition, to a great extent, and has 
continued to receive the support of federal and state governments since 
that time as evidenced by the Mining Act of 1866, Ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 
(1866), the Desert Land Act of 1877, Ch. 107,19 Stat. 377 (1877), and many 
subsequent land settlement acts. 
As a general rule, the property rights associated with the use of 
water are similar to property rights consistent with those of other real 
property. Water rights can, in general, be bought and sold. Title to such 
rights are registered and protected by law. This allows water to transfer 
to higher valued uses over time. The physical location of actual water use 
may change, within some limits. Still, there are differences in these 
property rights which significantly influence water use and exchange. 
First, the right to use water is not automatically granted into 
perpetuity. Technically, most states require that the water must be 
continued to be put to beneficial use in order for the right to be acquired 
and maintained. Thus far, as a practical matter, as long as the property 
right holder is able to show any use, rights will 1 ikely be held by that 
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individual until a decision is made to sell. 
Second, water rights are not associated with any specific water but, 
instead, wi th the ri ght to use a certa in quant i ty of water from a 
particular source. This is obviously necessary because of the fluid or 
transitory characteristics of water. 
Third, while water rights are transferable, movement of rights between 
drainage areas is generally not allowed. That is, a property right 
associated with water use cannot generally be transferred into another 
drainage area without a simultaneous transfer of actual water. 
"NATIVE AMERICAN" WATER RIGHTS 
Special classification has been given to two types of "Native 
American" (Indian) water ri-ghts: "aboriginal" and "reserved." Aboriginal 
water ri ghts are those ri ghts whi ch follow a "fi rst in time, fi rst in 
right" philosophy. An aboriginal right is assumed to exist for- those 
Indians for whom the use of water in farming or domestic activities can be 
historically documented and tied to a specific geographic location. While 
many of the American Indian tribes were nomadic, some did practice farming 
on a regular basis and maintained those activities in a specific geographic 
area. Since those activities pre-dated most, if not all other current 
uses, there is some justification of a IIfirst in time, first in right" or 
aboriginal award. While there is often some difficulty involved in 
establ i shi ng the exact nature and extent of water use by such tri bes or 
groups, the perfection of these rights generally does not require any 
extensive economic analysis. Historical documents are most often relied on 
in making a determination of aboriginal rights. 
"Reserved" rights are also also related to a "first in time, first in 
right" philosophy, but the quantification is much more complex. A reserved 
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right is said to apply to those Indians who, though not historically a 
stationary people, were placed on a reservation or area of land, 
specifically set aside for their long-term use. The claim has been made 
that there was an implicit awarding of water rights on the reservation at 
the time of its creation. In general, the dates of the reservation 
------
establishment determine the priority date for water rights perfection if 
the Indians can qualify for a reserved right. 
In response to many of the early land development and settlement acts 
passed in the United States during the 19th century and early part of the 
20th century, 1 ands were settl ed throughout the water-short West. Early 
claims to land (and water) were generally established in those areas which 
adjoi ned "fl owi ng" streams, accordi ng to states or terri tori a 1 water 1 aw. 
Little groundwater was appropriated during the period. These settled lands 
were either brought into agricultural production or existing production was 
modified through the extensive use of irrigation techniques. 
The development of lands which Indians had formerly intermittently 
used coincided with, and contributed to, the establishment of Indian 
reservations. These reservations were established by treaty. Later 
modifications in or abandonment of these treaties caused that Indian lands 
were en 1 arged, reduced, eli m i nated or otherw i se changed. The acqu is it ion 
of public lands (and water) continued unabated until the early part of the 
20th century. As lands and water were acquired by non-Indians, the 
potential for conflict increased. 
In 1906, the u.S. Government brought su it aga i nst pri vate 1 andowners 
living below the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana on behalf of 
the Indians claiming that all of the water in the Milk River was 
appropri atel y the property of the Ind i ans and was necessary for meet i ng 
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reservation purposes. While the resolution of the issue might have been 
very simple had Congress simply granted certain water rights when the 
various reservations were established, such was not the case. 
The defendants (non-Indian landholders) claimed that they held valid 
water rights under Montana State law and were beneficially using a 
considerable amount of water for farming and ranching purposes. The 
defendants alleged that the states had, after all, been given the right to 
regulate or control the use of in-state water by the Federal Government. 
The issue of Indian water rights was, consequently, left to the courts 
to be resol ved. In 1908, the u.S. Supreme Court rul ed that all 
reservations had a Ilreservedll right to water because Congress had certainly 
intended to reserve water for an Indian reservation at the time of its 
creation (Winters v. United States, 1908). Such a position was taken by 
the Court because water was considered a prerequisite to the development of 
vir t u all y all W est ern 1 and s , I n d ian 1 an d sin c 1 u de d . W h i 1 e the Su pre m e 
Court appeared to settl e the issue of "reserved ll ri ght, they fa i 1 ed to 
suggest or select a method by which that water right could be quantified. 
Hence, the question of quantity accompanying such reserved rights was left 
open for future debate. 
In subsequent court decisions (Arizona v. California (1963); Tuttle 
(1982); and Roncolio (1982)), a quantification process and standard has 
emerged. The overall standard is Ilpracticably irrigable acreage" or PIA. 
In essence, the standard suggests that the quantity of reserved rights to 
be acquired by a tribe depends on the amount of practicably irrigable 
acreage that can be shown to exist on the reservation. Traditionally, PIA 
has been demonstrated through the extensive use of economic anlayses. 
Included in the process of rights perfection under a PIA standard are 
numerous non-economic issues. First, the date of reservation establishment 
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is critical in determining the award since individuals perfecting water 
rights prior to the date of reservation establishment have priority over 
reservation uses. Second, the claim cannot technically exceed the water 
available so the physical volume and associated hydrology of the water 
basin must be determined. Third, the right is apparently tied to the 
purpose(s) for which the reservation was originally established. For 
instance, if the primary purpose of the reservation was farming, then 
farming would be considered the activity on which to base the 
quantification process. On the other hand, if grazing were the primary 
purpose of reservation establishment, then presumably the quantification 
would be based on grazing uses. Because of the many changes in reservation 
boundari es through time, these issues must be resolved for each add it ion 
and/or change in the boundary. A portion of the reservation may have been 
established for farming purposes; a later portion added for grazing. Under 
a strict interpretation of purpose and time standards, each area would have 
to individually be quantified on the basis of purpose and time. It is 
presumed that if the pri mary purpose of the reservat i on were recreat ion, 
then recreation activities would provide the basis for the evaluation. 
However, it does not appear that recreation or industrial developments were 
ever considered as the primary purposes for which the reservations were 
established (Arizona v. California, 1963). 
Assuming that farming was the primary purpose for which the 
reservation was established, additional criteria must then be met. First, 
it must be shown that it is technically possible to irrigate the lands in 
question using current practices. Second, agronomic feasibility or the 
physical ability to produce various crops must be demonstrated. Agronomic 
feas i bi 1 i ty is cont i ngent upon the app 1 i cat i on of today's eng i neeri ng and 
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agronomic technologies. The irrigation system must be designed, crops 
selected, agronomic practices specified, and yields determined. Once these 
issues are settled, only then a determination must be made as to the 
economic feasibility or viability of the farming operation. 
Each of these steps can result in complex and extended litigation. 
Yet, when all is said and done, an award of reserved water right based on 
the concept of practicably irrigable acreage depends, to a significant 
degree, on the outcome of an economic analysis. As noted in past cases, 
the concept of PIA requires that the Indians demonstrate that the water can 
be put to a beneficial use in purposes for which the reservation was 
estab 1 i shed. I n essence, benefi cia 1 use has genera 11 y been interpreted by 
the courts to mean that benefits must exceed costs. To the extent that 
crop production can pay for the necessary water development (assuming all 
other conditions are met), the Indians are granted the right to that amount 
of water. 
A very simple example might serve to more clearly illustrate the 
appl ication of this standard of measurement. Assume that a reservation 
contained 25,000 acres of irrigable land which, if irrigated properly and 
completely, would require 75,000 acre feet of water. Furthermore, assume 
that it is technically possible to irrigate all those lands. It has been 
demonstrated that production is possible on that acreage for a large number 
of crops. Finally, assume that the Indians can pay for the associated 
development costs including, but not limited to, land leveling, dams, 
ditches, fences, roads, buildings and equipment. The Indians have 
demonstrated, under the standard of PIA, that the land is capable of being 
farmed in an economical or cost-effective manner. Revenues earned from the 
production of the crops exceed the costs associated with crop production. 
Therefore, the necessary rights are granted. 
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Once granted, these reserved rights are not totally consistent with 
water rights perfected by others, however. First, while the quantification 
process is loosely based on the notion of beneficial use, there is no 
requirement that beneficial use actually be made of the water once 
acquired. In fact, there does not appear to be any restriction on what the 
final use may be on the reservation once the size of the award has been 
determined. Furthermore, these rights may not be terminated by abandonment 
or forfeiture. There is no way, short of action by Congress, that a 
reserved water right can be withdrawn for application to a non-beneficial 
use, illegal use, or even a total lack of use. Once awarded, the right 
remains with the tribe into perpetuity. Third, it does not appear that the 
property right can be transferred off the reservation. Thus far, it 
appears that water is awarded on the same basis as reservation land. It is 
to be held in "reserve" for present and future generations of Indians and 
cannot be sold. Fourth, the Courts have not required that any form of 
compensation be granted to those parties having to forfeit their rights to 
water use. The transfer is made without incurring any explicit costs. 
In recent court cases, (Arizona v. California, 1963; Tuttle, 1982; and 
Roncol io, 1982) a fifth condition, a "sensitivity doctrine," has emerged. 
The doctrine states, in its most simplistic form, that the Court must 
consider losses elsewhere in making its decision regarding the amount to be 
awarded to Indians under the reserved doctrine. While not universally 
accepted as a point of law, it does appear that the sensitivity doctrine 
plays some role in the final determination of water rights. 
THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM 
The major problem with "reserved" and "aboriginal" water rights as 
outlined above is simply that most of the streams are fully appropriated at 
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the present time. Many, such as the Gila River in Arizona, are 
overappropriated. There is simply not enough water in the various streams 
and ri vers to accommodate exi st i ng appropri ated ri ghts, much 1 ess newl y 
determined and granted rights. Consequently, if an award is made to the 
Indians on the basis of aboriginal use or a reserved right, present users 
will be denied use. In many cases, there will be a gallon-for-gallon 
reduct i on to others. 
A summary of potential claims for reserved rights only is shown in 
Table 1 (Western States Water Council, 1984). The summary included here is 
not intended as a precise estimate of claims that will be made nor a 
suggestion that they should. The summary is intended only as an overview 
of the quantity of potential Indian water claims. Application of the PIA 
standard to the potent i all y i rri gabl e acres 1 i st for some of the states 
would probably result in a smaller award of water rights than the potential 
cl aim suggests. However, because of the 1 ack of ava i 1 abl e data, no 
irrigable acreage or potenti'al claim is made for many reservations, some 
with very large gross acreages. Also, few Indian claims for fisheries, 
natural resource or industrial developments, recreation, or aboriginal 
rights are included. 
Total claims equal nearly 45.9 mill ion acre-feet per year. This is 
equal to 3.5 times the average annual flow of the Klamath or Colorado 
rivers and more than five times the flow of the Flathead or Salmon Rivers. 
It is nearly twenty-five times the annual flow of the San Juan or Yuba 
Rivers and equal to roughly 1.5 times the storage capacity of Lake Powell 
or Lake Mead. 
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Table 1. State by State Summary of Potential Indian Reserved Water Claims 
Other 
BIA Area, BIA Gross Presently Potentially Estimate Potential 
Agency Juri s- Area Irr'i gated Irrigable of Water Claim 
diction in Acres Acres Acres Needs AcFt/Yr 
Alaska (7) 386,142.19 0 0 0 0 
Arizona (20) 19,808,056.88 188,410 6,516,208 18,034,825 31,273,343 
California ( 80) 583.235.34 14,741 58,665 0 269,282 
Colorado (2) 755,399. 71 0 93,000 0 0 
Idaho (5) 826,863.26 102,229 227,417 0 762, 721 
Montana ( 7) 5,224,864.06 10.2,338 450,000 3,993,872 6,632,902 
Nebras ka (4) 64,475.70 0 14,482 0 26,481 
Nevada (24) 1,154,109.89 34,442.34 24,670 0 210,556.06 
New Mexico ( 26) 7,408,225.35 13,846 74,297 17,309 328,332.6 
~ N. Dakota (6) 851,925.99 0 6.6,62-6. 51 0 190,045.03 
Oregon (3) 757,362.54 1,800 100,000 0 450,000 
S. Dakota (9) 5,091,218.73 
° 
439,797.49 0 1 , 269, 306. 37 
Utah (5 ) 2,283,986.00 3,175 172,520 481,078 630,007 
Washington (23) 2,496,422.89 165,000 435,000 0 3,371,805 
Wyoming (1 ) 1 , 888, 031 • 81 0 103,000 0 477,292 
SOURCE: Western States Water Council. 1984. "Indian Water Rights in the West." Study 
prepared for the Western Go~ernors' Association. May. 
" 
The state with the largest potential claim is Arizona. As Figure 1 
illustrates, Arizona's dependable water supply pales in comparison. In the 
other states, the proport ions refl ected in the fi gure woul d be reversed 
somewhat in that potential Indian claims would be a fraction of the 
dependable water supply in most other states. However, the real issue even 
in states for which a smaller share of water is to be affected is that 
there is little, if any, water available to new users. The water has been 
appropriated. In light of the possible consequences associated with water 
35 
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Figure 1. Comparison of potential Indian water claims and 
dependable water supply in Arizona. 
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right transfers, it is amazing that little specific legal guidance has been 
given regarding the techniques to be employed in the quantification 
process. The major unresolved issues with respect to a determination of 
reserved water rights under a PIA standard is the methodology with which 
the claimed reserved rights will be determined and perfected and the impact 
on society as a whole of such transfers. 
It may be argued that, in the case of reserved water rights, the law 
is being applied in an attempt to protect or recapture a lost property 
right. While it is true that the courts would protect the rights of any 
water user presently abused, Indian rights included, it should also be 
noted that in the case of any other water right holder, that the non-Indian 
holder (or predecessor) took an active role in the acquisition and 
development of the property right. Such cannot be said for the Indians. 
While some Indian tribes have acquired water rights on the same basis as 
any other water right holder (by making application through the appropriate 
state agency), the majority of Indian tribes have not taken any action, nor 
has the Federal Government as trustee for the tribes, except for the 
limited number of lawsuits thus far conducted by the U.S. on behalf of the 
tribes. The difference between the court protecting the right of a private 
citizen who developed (or purchased the right to use water) may be 
conceptually different from that of the Indians wherein no effort was made 
to acquire the necessary water rights. Neither the Federal Government, in 
its trust responsibility, nor the Indians themselves have attempted to 
mitigate the situation they suddenly find themselves in, with few 
exceptions. While a question may be raised regarding the responsibility of 
the Indians or Federal government to mitigate adverse impacts of off-
reservation water development, that is primarily a legal question and one 
that cannot be answered here. 
1 1 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 
While economic analysis may have a limited role in the determination 
of aboriginal water rights, it appears that such rights are more of a 
historical and legal matter rather than an economic one. Hence, this 
discussion will be limited to that dealing with reserved water rights. 
With the Court's decisions regarding reserved water rights, it might 
be concluded that the perfection of reserved rights would proceed very 
rapidly with a minimum effort and cost. Such has, however, not been the 
case. Litigation on a specific case may extend over several years and cost 
millions of dollars. 
We would suggest that there are three realms wherein problems may lie 
with respect to extended and costly litigation. First, a major function, 
it appears, of litigation is to attempt to instigate a change in the rules 
to make the standard or precedent more favorable to one side or the other. 
Once again, this is a legal matter or, at the very least, part of the legal 
system. As such, it lies outside the breadth of this paper. The other two 
problems with respect to the economic issues, (conceptual matters and 
empirical applications), are within the scope of this paper. First, at the 
conceptual level, we have identified eight areas where economic t~eory or 
concepts may impact the outcome of an "econom i cIt anal ys is. Second, at the 
empirical level, seven areas have been identified. Some topics are common 
to both the conceptual and empirical levels and are discussed accordingly. 
Conceptual Issues 
The first conceptual issue is that of society's welfare. In the most 
basic sense, society's welfare is improved as long as some action results 
in at least one member of society being made better off without any other 
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member being made worse off. As soon as no other transfer can be made 
which improves someone's position without adversely impacting anyone else', 
then the system is sa i d to be "Pareto" effi ci ent. Compensat i on mayor may 
not actually be required but the full impacts are identified. Free markets 
or an omniscient government might bring Pareto efficiency about. In a free 
market, where property rights were completely transferable and goods were 
scarce, a resource would shift to its highest valued use(s). A 
determination of gains and losses is difficult, at best. Yet, at a 
conceptual level, any mandated shifts in resource use without a 
consideration of net gains/losses to all parties involved will not insure 
that society remains even as well off as they were prior to any changes in 
ditribution. 
It may be argued that the market for water rights is a reasonably 
well-functioning market and, as such, would allow water to move to its 
highest valued use(s). In this regard, it should be noted that nothing has 
prevented the Indians from making a claim for water rights through the 
usual process outlined by the various states over time. Some tribes have, 
in fact, made appl ication for and received water rights under the 
appropriate state jurisdiction. In general, we would suggest that the 
water has historically been employed in its most productive use(s). If 
such water rights (and the accompanying water) is suddenly transferred 
without an accompanying demonstration that the water will be put to 
benefi cia 1 use, then soc i ety is c 1 earl y worse off. That the I nd i ans have 
not perfected rights to water would suggest that higher valued uses already 
exist and are being used. 
The second conceptual issue is that of risk. The removal of a 
valuable resource without accompanying strict assurances that the resource 
will be put to a similarly valued (or higher valued) use would suggest a 
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reduction is society's welfare. This implies an increased risk to society 
should the transfer take place. This point is particularly relevant since 
even though the present quantification standard is based on beneficial use, 
no requirement is imposed that such use actually has to occur nor that 
beneficial use on the reservation be as high or higher than existing off-
reservation uses. 
Furthermore, there is the d i st i nct poss i bi 1 i ty that water, once 
assigned through a reserved right proceeding, will never be allowed to re-
enter the market regardless of the gain or loss to society (Roncolio, 
1982). A transfer in water outside of any workable market would suggest 
that water woul d not be ava i 1 abl e for other purposes at a 1 ater poi nt in 
time. If the water is to be held in reserve in the same sense as 
reservation land in a sense that it cannot be bought and sold, society's 
risk would increase. Given the increased risk associated with such a 
.-
transfer, strict evaluation procedures would need to be used to insure that 
such transfers are cost effective. 
The third conceptual issue involves the very nature of the analysis. 
Calculation of benefits and costs may follow two distinct approaches: 
financial or economic. The courts have recognized the differences between 
these two conceptual approaches. The Special master in California vs. 
Arizona (Tuttle, 1982) stated the following: "For present purposes, a 
finding that annual benefits exceed costs will suffice for a finding of 
practicable irrigability." In response to that statement, Burness, et al., 
1983, indicate that this conclusion on the part of the Master was 
consistent with economic analysis as opposed to financial analysis. They 
suggested that, 
14 
"Thus, economic feasibility is established as the means for 
demonstrating practicably irrigable acreage which, in turn, 
serves to quant i fy water reserved to the tri bes. 1I 
Economic analysi sis based on the concept of opportunity cost. In 
using an economic analysis, it is imperative that the true opportunity cost 
of resources be determined and used. The true opportunity cost of a 
resource is simply the value that must be foregone if that resource is used 
in another process. For instance, the true opportunity cost of using water 
in agriculture is the value that the water in alternative uses. This 
concept is so basic to economic analysis that it is taught in virtually 
every introductory economics textbook. The use of economic analysis 
requires the adoption and correct application of opportunity cost to each 
and every resource being considered in a production process. 
The fourth conceptual problem, related to the first three, is that of 
an uncompensated transfer of water (and wealth). The argument is sometimes 
advanced that if water was subsidized during early development, then there 
may not be any significant impact to society should that water be simply 
transferred without compensation. However, this ignores any change in the 
value of that water that may have occurred over time because of changes in 
technologies. 
Assume that a current water right owner purchased that right in recent 
times. The price paid for that water would represent its current value in 
production, assuming a reasonably, well-functioning market. It would most 
clearly represent a higher value than the price (if any) originally paid 
for the water given historical changes in related technologies. To make a 
transfer without due compensation brings about a redistribution of wealth. 
The party who originally gained through water development will likely not 
be the one to suffer the consequences of the water transfer. However, even 
if they were, there is some loss that will be incurred because other 
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investments have been made by the impacted party in order to enhance water 
productivity. But this issue is not simply as issue of whether 
compensation should or should not be granted. 
In assessing whether a transfer should take place, even if a legal or 
political decision were made that compensation would not be required, the 
true opportunity cost of that water must be measured or evaluated in 
conducting an economic feasibility analysis. There is a real cost 
associated with the transfer of that water, even should compensation never 
be made. That cost must be identified and accounted for. Water is not a 
free good. Consequently, in making a determination of economic 
feasibility, it is imperative that the true opportunity cost of that water 
be included in the analysis if economic analysis is to be the basis from 
which all the calculations are made. 
The fifth issue is that of time. Reservations were established in the 
past, as were appropriated water rights. Water rights are, however, being 
evaluated for transfer in the present based on some present and future 
needs. Area 11 ocat i on wi 11 impact present and future generat ions of both 
sides. Admittedly, there is an opportunity cost to those impacted by the 
reassignment -- today and tomorrow. That must include the increase in 
welfare experienced by the Indians as well as the decrease in welfare 
experienced by those who must give that water up. 
It may be argued that those living in the past were adversely impacted 
by past and present water rights assignments. It is, however, unl ikely 
that a change in today's assignment will make those who lived previously 
any better off! Therefore, we would suggest that the analysis must focus 
on those impacted in the present time period and, possibly, those which may 
be impacted in a future time period, though such determinations are nearly 
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impossible to make since future generations are not here to make their 
wishes known. A determination of benefits and costs can be done in today's 
terms, with some consideration of the benefits and costs to future 
generations. 
The sixth conceptual issue is that of an appropriate discount rate to 
use in the discounting/compounding process. In "reserved" water right 
cases, a benefit-cost analysis has been used to determine whether benefits 
exceed costs for the project/development inquest ion. _ Benefi ts and costs 
occurring in different time periods are brought to a comparable basis 
through the process of discounting. This is a well-recognized practice in 
project evaluation. The difficult issue is to determine the appropriate 
rate to be used or employed in the discounting process. In order that this 
portion of the analysis be consistent with the others, the opportunity cost 
of capital is the correct conceptual approach to adopt. 
What must be given up in order for a transfer of financial capital to 
take place? Certainly, current production, consumption, and government 
spending must be foregone if a transfer takes place. Note that the correct 
opportunity cost cannot be limited just to the lost opportunities in 
business and government. Today's consumption is also foregone and its 
opportunity cost must be included in the calculation. In addition, future 
generations are impacted. As a conceptual matter, it should be noted that 
both present and future generat ions of those who ga in and those who lose 
must be considered. Consequently, an appropriate discount rate to use 
would be one that reflected opportunities foregone today, as well as 
opportunities foregone tomorrow. Therefore, present and future 
opportunities foregone becomes that standard -- not just the future, nor 
just the present; not just to those who gain, but also those who lose; not 
just business or government, but businesses, government, and consumers. 
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It seems appropriate to also suggest that opportunities foregone in 
the past are not relevant to the analysis since such opportunities would 
presumably have been undertaken had the benefits actually exceeded the 
costs. Once again, the fact that such acquisitions did not take place, as 
a general rule, would suggest that few opportunities were foregone in the 
past. 
A seventh conceptual point has to do with the incidence of both 
primary and secondary benefits and costs. As is the case with most 
deve 1 opment projects, the benefi ts and costs (both pri mary and secondary) 
are not al ways real ized by the same group of people or even in the same 
geographic area. Consequently, some area or group may receive the benefits 
yet have none of the costs imposed. Alternatively, another group may incur 
virtually all of the costs, yet receive few if any of the benefits. If a 
transfer of wealth is to take place, then the losses and gains to all 
parties involved must be accounted for. Unless all benefits and costs are 
accounted for (primary or secondary), any potential development project 
could be shown to be viable by excluding some or all of the costs. 
It would appear that a consideration of all benefits and costs is even 
more critical in this situation where it can be said that those who lose 
their water right did nothing of themselves to deny the Indians their water 
rights. That the Indians did not receive some water would suggest that 
they, or the U.s. acting as their trustee, were negl igent in their 
respons i bi 1 it i es. The current approach places the ent ire fi nanc i alb 1 arne 
those who were doing exactly what that same Federal Government was 
encouraging them to do -- settle the Western lands through an appropriation 
of water. 
Economic analysis is conducted so that all benefits and costs can be 
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enumerated and the resulting calculations made. Those calculations may be 
expressed in a benefit-cost ratio as in the case of reserved water rights. 
Other noneconomic forms of evaluation may not require as explicit 
accounting of all costs and benefits. However, if economic (benefit-cost) 
analysis is to be the yardstick by which reserved water rights are to be 
made, then it must be recognized that there is a potential for three 
poss i b 1 e outcomes. First, all benefi ts may exceed all costs (B/C > 1) and 
the transfer woul d be effi c i ent. Second, all benefi ts may equal all costs 
(B/C = 1) and the transfer mayor may not be appropriate. Third, and the 
most critical in understanding the implications of an economic analysis, 
all benefits may be exceeded by all costs (B/C < 1) and the transfer could 
not be justified on economic terms. If the courts (and other parties 
involved) are not willing to recognize and submit to the possibility of 
these three outcomes, then econom i c anal ys is is an i nappropri ate anal ys is 
to follow in determining the quantity of reserved water rights. 
An eighth conceptual issue focuses on the term "equity." The claim 
has been made that, from a conceptual point, equity requires that the 
Indians be given considerations above those given to others involved or 
impacted by the transfer. First, it must be recognized that economics elas 
with questions of efficiency not equity. Efficiency is the realm in which 
economics can provide objective, meaningful analysis. Economists can 
provide information concerning the impacts of various transfers to all 
parties inovlved. Whether such transfers are equitable, however, is 
another matter. Still, equity implies certain criterion that can be used 
in evaluating such transfers. "Equity" is defined as 'freedom from bias or 
favoritism' (Merriam-Webster, 1983). Some authors (Burness, et al., 1983) 
have argued that certain rules of evaluation need to be changed in order to 
insure that the Indians are treated equitably. To adjust the rules by 
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which the rest of society is evaluated or to view gains to the Indians 
without also considering losses occuring elsewhere hardly seems consistent 
with the concept of equity as expressed above. Is it appropriate to argue 
'equity' from a single position? 
Empirical Issues. 
There are a host of areas where changes in empirical approaches can 
modify the results of a benefit-cost analysis. Interestingly enough, one 
of the most basic divergences has been a failure to understand the 
difference between economic and financial analysis. In its most basic 
form, economic analysis requires an examination of all explicit and 
implicit benefits and costs associated with a particular project or 
activity. Financial analysis, on the other hand, requires only that out-
of-pocket or explicit costs be accounted for. Financi'al analysis, for the 
most part, ignores the full concept of opportun i ty cost. If, as suggeste€i 
above, economic analysis is the appropriate analysis to use (and that view 
appears to be one accepted by the courts) then it must be used consistently 
throughout the analysis. a national prespective may not be required in an 
economic analysis -- but a perspective broad enough to consider all costs 
and benefits is necessary. 
The second empirical issue is the use of standardized and generally 
accepted project evaluation practices. Project feasibility analysis 
actually began in the U.S. in the 1 ate 1800's. From the begi nni ng, 
projects have been analyzed following what was determined to be the state-
of-the-art in economic theory and application at a point in time. These 
standards have changed through time as more conceptually sound and 
emp i ri call y accurate measurement methods and techno log i es were found. In 
fact, current and past project evaluation standards have evolved from only 
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the most bas i c pri nci pl es into a set of reasonabl e and manageabl e 
instruct ions/procedures. It woul d, therefore, appear reasonabl e to value 
proposed projects or developments involving reserved water rights with 
present evaluation standards, such as reflected in the 1983 Principles and 
Guidel ines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983). In fact, the federal 
government has mandated the use of these standards in project evaluation 
for Indian projects (U.S. Department of Interior, 1980) as well as others. 
However, even had no such standards been mandated for the Indi ans, they 
would be the most appropriate ones to use for several reasons. First, they 
represent the latest consensus in appropriate evaluation techniques. 
Second, they reflect economic theory as nearly as is possible with today's 
technology. Third, all other engineering and agronomic standards are 
measured in today's or the current period terms. 
Burness, et al., }980, have suggested that changes in the standards 
since they first were applied to project analysis preclude their use in 
current project analysis, particularly with respect to Indian Reserved 
Water Rights 1 itigation. Of course, all currently approved projects must 
also abide by these same standards. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that all other techno log i es and standards (eng i neeri ng, agronom i c, 1 ega 1, 
soil s, hydrologic, etc.) are considered in the present time period. That 
is, only current technologies are considered in making a determination of 
reserved water rights. Past irrigation technologies are not utilized, nor 
are past agronomic practices. If such were to be used, the number of acres 
that could potentially irrigated and the quantity of yields under older 
vari et i es and agronom i c pract ices woul d 1 ike 1 y make econom i c feas i bi 1 i ty 
even more d i ffi cul t to achi eve. As an empi ri ca 1, as well as conceptua 1 
matter, if current technologies are to be used to evaluate project 
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feasibility, then current economic practices should also be used. 
The third empirical issue is the treatment of labor costs in project 
analysis. From a conceptual basis, labor cost should be included 
consistent with the opportunity cost of that labor. It has been suggested 
that because Indians generally live in areas and cultures with high rates 
of unemployment, there should not be any labor cost assessed against the 
project. The use of zero 1 abor costs is not very compell i ng from ei ther 
and conceptual or an empirical basis. 
Due to di fferences in job requirements, 1 abor mobil ity, and job 
duration, there are really two labor issues involved in any project -- its 
construction and operation. Because these two activities have differing 
labor demands (in a skill as well as a temporal sense) it is clear that 
there is justification for treating them differently. Construction labor 
is generally short-term. On-the-job training does not really provide the 
laborers with permanent, transferable job skills. Only if the labor is 
perfectly mobile, which seems unlikely on a Indian reservation, could that 
labor take advantage of continuing employment possibil ities. Hence, it 
would seem appropriate that the opportunity cost of some labor during 
construction be valued at less than some current market wage rate. 
However, it is also obvious that the opportunity cost of that labor is 
not zero. Indians have alternative uses of their time. Hunting, fishing, 
religious ceremonies, and numerous other similar activities constitute a 
significant portion of Indian society. Those activities involve labor and 
because they choose to participate in some non-work activities, the 
opportunity cost of that labor cannot be said to equal zero. 
The opportunity cost of that labor should be valued at the wage rate 
at which the Indians would agree to work in the type of employment 
resulting from a construction activity. If they were to go to work for 
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$4/hour, then that become the opportunity cost of their labor. to this in 
a slightly different way, if Indians are not willing to work fo r$O.25/hour 
but are willing to work only when the wage rate reaches $4/hour, then 
$4/hour represents the opportunity cost of the next best alternative. This 
concept may be referred to as a "wi thhol di ng pri ce" threshhol d. 
Note, however, that valuing labor cost at $4/hour ignores the loss to 
other workers, who previously had been working on similar projects, would 
now become unemployed because of that I nd ian's work. The actual benefi t 
attributable to a project would be that portion of the wages/income above 
that lost elsewhere. Only in instances of significant national 
unemployment could such benefits be credited outright during the 
construction of a project. 
The present version of the principles and guidelines, (U.S. Water 
Resources Council, 1983) does allow for the inclusion of labor benefits 
duri ng a project's construct i on phase. Even in these standards, however, 
the benefits are limited to those workers who would have been previously 
unemployed. This implies that some matching of jobs and skills levels be 
done. Were the proper investigation made, it is conceivable that some 
labor benefits could be counted during project construction in conformance 
with present evaluation guidelines, although it is _obvious that the 
opportunity cost of previously employed workers is not equal to zero. 
A second type of employment issue is labor used during project 
operation. It can be treated differently for several reasons. First, 
skills learned during project operation are assumed to have a more lasting 
benefit because project operation is expected to continue for several 
years. Second, such ski 11 s are more eas i ly transferred since those same 
type of jobs are generally available in other parts of most regional/local 
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economies. Third, there may be other employment opportunities on the 
project over time and if personnel are promoted or reassigned, then there 
is a cost involved in finding and training their replacement. Finally, 
there is a problem of valuing "leisure" time (time engaged in activities 
other than "work"). The current standards for project evaluation do not 
allow for the inclusion of labor benefits during project operation. This 
exclusion of labor benefits during project operation also applies to Indian 
projects (U.S. Department of Interior, 1980). 
In addition to the problems associated with an empirical estimate of 
the value of non-work time, there is a substantial empirical problem 
associated with the treatment of underemployed labor vs. unemployed labor. 
In the process of P&G development, it was noted that some decisions 
relative to the treatment of labor values were arbitrary in the sense that 
empirical measurement was nearly impossible to make. The standard included 
in the Principles and Guidelines likely underestimate some of the benefits 
derived from employing underemployed or unemployed labor and overestimate 
other labor benefits. It is, in a sense, a compromise given the 
uncerta i nt i es assoc i ated with empi ri cal measurement. . Unt i 1 such time as 
empirical technqiues allows for a more accurate quantification of labor 
benefits, the generally accepted evaluation techniques such as reflected in 
the 1983 Principles and Guidelines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983) 
remain the best available. 
To assume that the cost of Indi an 1 abor is zero for the ent ire 50 or 
100 year life of project operation implicitly assumes that the Indians 
never will gain any transferable skills during their lifetimes (or the 
1 ifetimes of their children and children's children). If the purpose of 
the granting of a reserved water right is to meet the tribes need and to 
provide an improvement in their social well-being, then the use of a zero 
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wage cost during operation would appear to add insult to injury. What is 
being suggested is either that the Indians will never gain and useful 
skills or that they will never be able to compete with others in society 
for available jobs. It may also suggest, that they will always be a people 
without employemnt opportunities either on or off the reservations. That 
is, to say the least, not a particularly cheerful outlook. 
A fourth empirical issue is the level and type of activities often 
inc 1 uded in the anal ys is. For instance, it may be unreasonable to include 
the production of strawberries, raspberries, or asparagus in an area where 
there has not been any commercial production of those commodities unless a 
definitive analysis can show or illustrate that there is some basis for the 
existence of a comparative advantage in that area. This may include a 
comparative advantage in production, processing, and/or marketing. Unless 
i t E: an bed e m 0 n s t rat edt hat a par tic uJ a r are a has so mer e a 1 a d van tag e i n 
pr0duction, processing, or marketing, it cannot be reasonably assumed that 
production will leave any exi'sting production area. Furthermore, such an 
analysis effeE:tively ignores the impact that demand has on the production 
and consumption of many commodities. Second, if such a strong comparative 
advantage exists, why is production not already occurring in an area? Food 
(or recreation or minerals or virtually anything else) production occurs in 
a particular location because, in the long run, there is some profit to be 
made. The absence of production in an area may be the strongest evidence 
that no comparative advantage exists. Even in the event that similar 
products are grown and sold within the project area, does this justify that 
crop's automatic inclusion in the crop mix? Not necessarily. Unless it 
can be demonstrated that there is a shortage of land from which that 
increase in "incremental" production might come from, market forces would 
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suggest that supply equals demand and any increased production would reduce 
price. Furthermore, even if it could be demonstrated that a shortage of 
appropriate land existed, an inordinate amount of increase could also 
effectively reduce the price received by the producers of that commodity. 
Hence, comparat i ve advantage and ana lys is of exi st i ng demand play a very 
1 arge rol e in the determi nat i on of appropri ate new crops. Any increase 
would be felt in decreased prices on and off the proposed project. 
As a result of these considerations and past abuses, limits are placed 
on the amount of "non-basic" crops that can be included in a project under 
the 1983 Principles and Guidelines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983). 
(Basic crops are the 10 most sidely grown crops in the country.) This 
rule is not as arbitrary as it may seem for the reasons cited above. 
Because there is rarely an evidence of a shortage of available lands on 
which to produce such commodities, it must be assumed that the 1 imiting 
factor is demand not supply. Consequently, unless it can be demonstrated 
that land is a limiting or constraining factor, net retur.ns or benefits 
from only the 10 basic crops can be considered in project analysis. 
Certain benefits from others crop can also be included. However, the 
benefi t whi ch can be cl aimed from the product i on of these other crops is 
limited to that which would be in excess of that which could be earned 
elsewhere. This, in effect, does make an allowance for whatever aspect of 
comparative advantage is relevant. This discussion assumes that inputs are 
valued at their full opportunity cost. Admittedly, if costs on a new 
project are subsidized sufficiently and a financial analysis is used (only 
explicit costs are accounted for), then a comparative advantage may be 
suggested where none, in fact, exists. A complete economic analysis would 
insure that comparative advantage (or disadvantage) would be clearly shown. 
Related to the discussion of the type of activities to be included is 
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the level of their inclusion. For example, while apple production has 
historically been practiced in a given area, if additional production were 
to increase area or state or regional production by two or three times, 
some price effect would almost certainly be felt. The exact impact would 
be difficult to quantify. In response to this problem the P&G's limit 
additional agricultural production to the same proportion of various crops 
as presently exists in an area. While not allowing an exact quantification 
of the price and quantity effect, the standards do provide a technique that 
i s easy to apply and that would be expected to ""1 i mit the error of 
estimation/calculation and provide a less costly means by which an answer 
can be arri ved at. 
The fifth empirical issue is the geographic extent to which benefits 
and costs apply. Project feasibility viewed from a single position or 
geographic area cannot be -presumed to capture the full economic costs of an 
action. Furthermore, it is not obvious that an economic analysis is 
approppriate were the analysis is isolated to a specific area. As noted 
above, it ts not unusual for project costs to be realized by different 
individuals and/or areas than those enjoying project benefits. One could 
virtually guarantee that the localized benefits would exceed localized 
costs in any event by simply adjusting the boundaries (geographic or 
population) associated with the development. Hence, there is no need for 
an economic analysis if one can insure that the benefits will exceed the 
costs by simply adjusting the population or geographic boundaries. 
Interestingly enough, current evaluation standards recognize this problem. 
They require that national benefits and costs be calculated and then they 
allow for the calculation of regional impacts. That way, national vs. 
regional impacts are clearly distinguished and the resulting impacts to 
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individuals are readily identified. 
An issue closely related to that of the geographic dispersion of 
benefits and costs is that of the inclusion of secondary benefits and 
costs. Conceptually, it would make no difference if secondary benefits 
were included in the anal ys is as long as secondary costs, where ever they 
occurred, were a 1 so i dent i fi ed. Est i mates of secondary impacts are 
generally derived through the use of some sort of an income or output 
mul t i pl i ers. It may be appropri ate to di spl ay those impacts, costs, as 
well as benefits. However, these values certainly have no place in a 
benefit-cost ratio. 
A sixth empirical issue is that of the appropriate discount rate to 
use in economic analyses. Suggestions for an appropriate discount rate to 
be used in such analysis include the present opportunity cost of capital, a 
zero opportunity cost of capital, or some range of rates. While a specific 
number may be difficult to determine, it should be based on the following 
facts. First, any project that is approved will require funds from present 
as well as future generati ons. There is no doubt but there is an 
intergenerational impact associated with such proposed developments and/or 
the transfer of water rights. Second, use of funds to justify a project 
implies that today's and tomorrow's government spending, business spending, 
and consumer spending must be foregone if the project is to be undertaken. 
This includes those projects wherein no development actually takes place 
but a transfer of water rights does. Whether development or transfer 
actua 11 y takes place or not, there is a current opportun i ty cost to those 
who must give something up in order for others to gain and the full impacts 
must be identified. 
The exclusive application of a long-term real rate is inappropriate 
because people will be impacted today should a change be made. As noted 
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previously, past rates are irrelevant to the calculus except to the extent 
that past rates can be used to predict future rates. Furthermore, both 
today's and tomorrow's rates should include consumption or investment 
foregone in all three impacted sectors -- government, business, and 
consumers. The fact that nei ther governments nor most bus i ness actua 11 y 
would have to forego anything unless the project were actually built would 
perhaps suggest a stronger weighting toward the opportunity cost of 
foregone consumer spending. 
In much of the work that has been done in the past, there has been a 
suggestion that an appropriate rate would be one that is comparable to the 
long term real rate of return on publ ic investments (bonds, notes, etc.) 
This rate ranges from 2-4% (Fraumeni and Jorgensen, 1980). However, there 
are several things wrong with this suggestion. First, there is absolutely 
no indication that the projects undertaken through such analyses are going 
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to be less risky than those undertaken by the private sector. In fact, 
given that the final use of the water is unknown .at the time of the award 
and the fact that the projects are generally new undertakings to the tribes 
involved, there may be a val id argument that the project payoffs are even 
more ri sky than other publ ic and private projects. Second, in the final 
analysis consumers must foregD consumption and businesses must foregone 
investments if such projects (or transfers) are actually realized. Third, 
the long-term rates cited above include rates derived over periods of time 
when many such rates were essentially controlled or regulated. Hence, they 
may not be an accurate refl ect i on of the true opportun i ty cost of 
businesses, governments or consumers. Reliance on a long-term real rate of 
return to bus i ness or governments ignores the pri vate sector to a 
significant degree and would understate the true opportunity cost of 
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capital. It might be argued that today's rate is high by historic 
standards. While that may be true, it should also be noted that a transfer 
of water rights and/or approval of project development impacts 1Qda~ 
consumer as well as tomorrow's. Hence, a present evaluation of current and 
expected opportunity cost must be accounted for. 
While the interest rate dilemma may seem insurmountable, federal 
policy makers have provided an answer that presumably represents some 
consensus of public opinion. Since the 1960's, the federal government has 
required the use of a discount rate consistent with the return on federal 
borrowings, except that upward and downward adjustments in that rate cannot 
exceed 1/4 of one percent for any year. Consequently, during periods of 
high inflation, the rate will not be that actually reflected in the market 
but some additive amount of the preceding year's rate. This tends to 
ameliorate the impact of inflation while still allowing for today's 
opportunity cost of capital to be reflected in the calculatio~ 
Note that the suggest i on was made that th is approach refl ects some 
consensus of public opinion. In support of that statement, it should 
suffice to suggest that the current standards have been subjected to years 
of review and, yet, remained in place for nearly two decades. Until this 
consensus was developed, the method by whi ch the rate was determi ned and 
changed was subject to numerous changes. In fact, the same conceptual and 
empirical issues raised in an evaluation of reserved water rights have been 
discussed each time the general principles and standards have been opened 
for review over the past two decades. The rules remain virtually the same. 
Yet, pressure for a low di scount rate cont i nues. In most, if not all 
development projects, the costs are incurred early in the project life 
wh i 1 e the st ream of benefi ts do not occur unt ill ater in the 1 i fe of the 
project. Consequently, the ratio of benefits to costs couldbe enhanced 
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(i ncreased) if a lower di scount rate were used. However, i ncreas i ng the 
value of the benefit stream through the introduction of a lower discount 
rate is not consistent with the notion and use of the true opportunity cost 
of financial capital nor will that lower rate provide for a conservation of 
resources. 
A final empirical issue rests with the actually methodology employed 
in the discounting and compounding process. In traditional project 
anal ys is, the flow of benefi ts and costs from all aspects of the proposed 
project or development are brought to a common point in time for comparison 
purposes. For instance, if recreation and agriculture depend on the 
completion of a water storage facil ity, then the costs to construct the 
facility are compounded until such time as the facility has been completed 
and the benefits (and any other costs) are discounted back to this same 
time peri od. To compare costs at a speci fi c poi nt in time wi th benefi ts 
at another poi nt in time as has been done in some reserved ri ght cases is 
totally inconsistent with the logic of compounding/discounting. A common 
point of time comparison must be used because costs and benefits received 
in different periods of time do not have the same value to us today. Note 
that this problem is particularly troublesome for multiple feature projects 
such as dams which include cost and benefit components for irrigated 
agriculture, recreation, flood prevention, and municipal and/or industrial 
use. Unless such costs and benefits are brought to a common point in time, 
the resulting benefit-cost ratio is meaningless. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 
It would seem appropriate to now summarize the application of economic 
analysis to reserved water rights. First, there may be some basis for 
using practiably irrigable acreage as defined by appropriate economic 
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analysis in determining a reserved water right because a similar process 
would certainly have to be used were the Indians to compete for the water. 
Historically, other members of our society had to demonstrate that the 
water could be put to beneficial use before those rights could be captured. 
Today, the standard of beneficial use is the primary criterion used to 
establ ish or perfect water rights. Hence, there is certainly some 
historical basis for its use in the case of establishing reserved water 
ri ghts. More spec i fi call y, i rri gated agri cul tyure const i tuted the pri mary 
use of water in those early days of development and would most likely have 
been the basis for water rights quantification. Second, the use of a 
measure of economic feasibility establishes some limit to the claim for 
reserved water rights. Third, the use of economic feasibility establishes 
a rul e for quant i fi cat i on that can be app 1 i ed to all concerned, provi ding 
the specific analytical analyses are performed in an appropriate manner. 
Finally, the use of a PIA standard using today's technologies almost 
guarantees that the Tribe will receive more water than they would have had 
rights been perfected during the time at which the reservation was 
established. 
Are there any reasons to suggest that PIA may not be the standard to 
use as a measure of quant i fi cat ion? Fi rst, under the current eva 1 uat ion 
procedures and practices (establish the right based on the purpose for 
which the reservation was established), there is no guarantee that the 
water will be put to the best use by society or the Indian tribe. Second, 
the use of a PIA standard may not provi de water to meet the "needs" of the 
tribe in question. For all of us, there is usually some divergence between 
wants and needs and the PIA standard may either provide too much water for 
meeting the tribe's needs or too 1 ittle water to meet those needs. The 
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PIA standard would, in all likelihood, never provide enough water to 
satisfy wants. Third, there is the potential that an award of water made 
on the basis of economic feasibility to the tribes may exceed that which is 
practicably even in the water shed. Fourth, a claim based on PIA may 
preclude every other non-Indian use, something which may be legally, 
po 1 it i call y, and econom i call y unpa 1 atab 1 e. Furthermore, the use of a PIA 
standard which would result in no award would likely be as unpalatable. 
This last possibility, in our opinion, has not been given the servious 
consideration that it merits. If project infeasibility and a resulting 
non-award is not acceptable to the parties involved in these matters, then 
PIA and economi c feas i bi 1 i ty are not useful measures. In summary, there 
are problems associated with the application of a PIA standard to the issue 
of reserved water rights. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The. iss u e 0 f res e r v e d w ate r rig h t sis ext rem ely com p 1 ex. Fro m the 
litigation that has occurred thus far, there does appear to be a major role 
for economic analysis in bringing about a resolution of the reserved water 
rights issue. There is little doubt but that the extent of the problem is 
significant enough to warrant its examination. For some states, t~e 
potential reserved water right claims exceed available supplies. For other 
states, even though the total claims are a small portion of the state's 
water supplies, those supplies are fully appropriated. Reserved water 
rights can be granted only if someone else is denied their rights. 
We have identified several conceptual and empirical issues which have 
yet to be resolved in the resolution of the reserved rights question. Of 
importance in the conceptual area are issues relating to economic and 
financial analysis, questions of Pareto efficiency, impact on society's 
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wealth when transfers are made, the issue of time, the role of beneficial 
use in rights determination, the geographic distribution of benefits/costs, 
the discount rate, the inclusion of secondary benefits/costs, and questions 
of equity. Empirical issues needing further discussion by economists and 
clarification by the courts are the role and use of current, federally 
mandated feasibility rules in actual rights determination, economic vs. 
financial feasibility approaches, method of treating labor cost during 
construction/operation, the type of activities that are appropriate to 
include and the level that such activities can be introduced, the 
geographic extent or distribution of benefits and costs; the discount rate, 
the discounting approach, the use of secondary benefits and costs, and the 
"t i me" d i mens i on of app 1 i cat i on of benefi ts and costs. 
We would suggest the use of economic analysis can be an appropriate 
tool in resolving this confl ict. We would also suggest that until some 
rules are establ ished which must be followed in determining "needs" or 
"wants", conflicts associated with the litigation process will expand. 
Even where a determination based on needs, we would expect the rules to be 
challenged simply because the stakes are so high. 
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